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Transnational Corporate Governance Codes: Lessons from Regulating Related Party 
Transactions in Hong Kong and Singapore   
Christopher CHEN, Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University 
Wai Yee WAN, Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University 
 
Abstract 
Many jurisdictions around the world, including Asia, have corporate governance codes largely 
based on the transnational code drafted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). The core ideas underpinning the OECD’s principles of corporate 
governance are board independence and proper management of conflicts of interest. These ideas, 
drawn from the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, are designed to protect 
companies and their shareholders. However, the question remains as to whether a transnational 
corporate governance code is always appropriate and effective, particularly when the kinds of 
companies listed on the stock exchange significantly differ from the Anglo-American model. In 
this article, we examine Hong Kong and Singapore, two Asian financial centers with national 
corporate governance codes that are closely aligned with the OECD principles of corporate 
governance. The regulatory and institutional framework supplementing these principles has 
broadly followed the Anglo-American model. However, Hong Kong and Singapore have listed 
companies that differ from the Anglo-American model, particularly in two respects: the 
shareholdings in the two Asian jurisdictions are much more concentrated, and they have 
comparatively higher levels of foreign listings. Drawing from empirical data related to tunneling 
through related party transactions from 2002-2004 and 2009-2014, which has remained rampant 
among listed companies in the two jurisdictions, we argue that that a one-size-fits-all approach to 
the OECD principles may not be appropriate if we ignore local characteristics. Specifically, we 
examine the concentrated shareholding structures and the large number of foreign (notably 
Chinese) firms listed in Hong Kong and Singapore. Although this article does not fundamentally 
challenge the utility of the OECD principles of corporate governance, we suggest that national 
regulators should not unreservedly follow these principles without adapting to local 
circumstances and devising specific strategies to deal with local problems.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Many jurisdictions around the world have corporate governance codes that are mostly 
drawn from, or based on, the transnational code of corporate governance drafted by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD code was first 
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published in 1999,1 with the latest version published by the G20/OECD in 2015.2 Although 
transnational codes are intended for general application,3 when they are implemented at the 
national level, they are often supplemented by a local regulatory framework of national 
legislation and listing rules. The OECD principles of corporate governance are largely drawn 
from the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. One of the earliest proponents of 
corporate governance code was the United Kingdom (U.K.), which published the Cadbury 
Report in 1992.4 This report emphasized the importance of a strong independent element on 
corporate boards5 and managing potential conflicts of interest.6 Along with the U.K., the United 
States (U.S.) model of corporate governance, with independent directors and the accountability 
of the board at its core, became globally influential during the 1990s and early 2000s. This 
followed the collapse of the Japanese stock market, which demonstrated the weaknesses of 
insider/control oriented countries. 7  Subsequently, the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model became the paradigm of internationally recognized good practices in corporate 
governance.  
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, affecting much of East Asia and 
South-east Asia, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) asserted that a 
principal reason for the crisis was the weak governance of companies in several Asian 
                                                 
* This research was supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic Research Fund Tier 2 
grant with the MOE’s official grant number MOE2015-T2-1-142. 
1 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), 
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=C/MIN(99)6&docLanguage=En (last 
visited October 25, 2018). 
2 OECD, G20/OECE Principles of Corporate Governance (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/g20-
oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en (last visited October 25, 2018). (OECD 
principles) 
3 See generally, Andrew Keay, An Analytical Study of Board Accountability in Transnational Codes of Corporate 
Governance in JEAN J. DU PLESSIS & CHEE KEONG LOW (eds.), CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES AND CRITICAL ANALYSES 117-143 (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017) 
and the references therein; Peer Zumbansen, ‘New Governance’ in European Corporate Law Regulation as 
Transnational Legal Pluralism, 15 EUROPEAN L. J. 246 (2009); Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: 
Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BROOKLYN J. OF INT’L L. 41 (2010). 
4 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992), available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (last visited October 25, 2018). (Cadbury Report) 
5 Cadbury Report, id., para 4.9. 
6 Id., paras 3.2 and 4.6. 
7 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 
331 (2001). 
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jurisdictions.8 Weak corporate governance was viewed as contributing to more expropriation by 
managers and greater falls in asset prices during the crisis. 9  Consequently, many Asian 
economies, either voluntarily or pushed by the World Bank or IMF, began a series of reforms to 
their corporate governance regulatory framework closely following OECD principles. Singapore 
published the first version of a Code of Corporate Governance in 2001.10 South Korea imposed 
board independence requirements for the Securities Exchange in 2000.11 Malaysia published its 
Code of Corporate Governance in 2000.12 The Stock Exchange of Thailand published the Code 
of Best Practice for the Directors of Listed Companies (the earlier version of the current Thai 
Corporate Governance Code) in 1998.13 
At the center of OECD principles is that corporate governance should promote fair and 
transparent markets, 14  and stock market regulations should support effective corporate 
governance.15 “Shareholders should also be sufficiently informed about, and have the right to 
approve or participate in, decisions concerning fundamental change such as … extraordinary 
transactions…” 16  Further, all material matters should be timely and accurately disclosed. 17 
OECD principles highlight the board of directors’ duty to ensure the strategic guidance of 
companies and the effective monitoring of management.18 For this reason the OECD emphasized 
that “the board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate 
affairs,”19 and henceforth “a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of 
                                                 
8 See Gilson, id.; see also generally ANDREW WALTERS, GOVERNING FINANCE: EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (Ithaca, Cornell University Press 2008). 
9 See generally Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. OF FIN. ECON. 141 
(2000). 
10 Monetary Authority of Singapore, Code of Corporate Governance, http://www.mas.gov.sg/Regulations-and-
Financial-Stability/Regulatory-and-Supervisory-Framework/Corporate-Governance/Corporate-Governance-of-
Listed-Companies/Code-of-Corporate-Governance.aspx (last visited October 25, 2018).  
11 Kyung-Hoon Chun, Korea’s Mandatory Independent Directors: Expected and Unexpected Roles, at 9, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2824303 (last visited October 25, 2018).  
12 Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (March 2000), 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/mccg_mar2000.pdf (last visited October 25, 2018).  
13 Thailand Code of Best Practice for the Directors of Listed Companies, https://ecgi.global/content/codes (last 
visited October 25, 2018).  
14 OECD principles, supra note 2, at 13. 
15 Id., at 16. 
16 Id., at 21. 
17 Id., at 41 et seq. 
18 Id., at 51 et seq. 
19 Id., at 57. 
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management.”20 Beyond providing for a strong independent element on corporate boards, the 
OECD focused on managing conflicts of interest. Its principles specify that: “[r]elated party 
transactions should be approved and conducted in a manner that ensures proper management of 
conflict of interests and protects the interests of the company and the shareholders.”21 
The key question is whether transnational corporate governance, and specifically the 
corporate governance norms set out in the OECD principles, improve corporate governance. 
Regardless of why a country has adopted the transnational corporate governance code (e.g. 
improving global ranking such as the World Banks’ Ease of Doing Business Ranking 22  or 
responding to corporate scandals to protect investors23), we have observed multiple layers when 
transnational corporate governance standards have been implemented nationally. The first layer 
is the way national laws adopt the standards, i.e. the law in the books. The second layer is how 
firms comply with corporate governance standards. This provides important insight into how 
firms in the market adopt international and/or national standards in practice. The third layer is the 
actual effect of corporate governance standards on a firm’s behavior. In this article, we focus on 
the second and third layers, i.e. how transnational corporate governance standards infiltrate 
market practices at the firm level, given a jurisdiction’s adoption of relevant standards. We 
examine whether there may be variations in compliance at the firm level even if a jurisdiction 
closely follows OECD principles in its written law.  
In this article, we focus on the effects that implementing OECD principles has had on 
related party transactions (RPTs) in Hong Kong and Singapore. RPTs raise tunneling issues 
because although RPTs can be beneficial to a company, they can also become transactions in 
which the management or controlling owners put the company’s resources into their own pockets 
at the expense of the minority shareholders. It is not always easy to tell whether these 
transactions fall within the former or latter category.24 Tunneling “not only raises distributional 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 OECD, supra note 2, principle II(F). 
22 World Bank, Ranking & Ease of Doing Business Score, http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings (last visited 
October 25, 2018). “Protecting Minority Investors” is an important benchmark in the ranking. 
23 See generally Michael C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
24 S. Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 22, 22 (2000); Atanasov et al. broaden the 
definition from tunneling by controlling shareholders to tunneling by managers who are not controllers. Vladimir 
Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. OF CORP. L. 1, 5 (2011). 
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concerns … but has an intuitively negative impact on capital markets as a whole and on their 
dynamic efficiency.”25 The finance literature has broadly supported the view that tunneling has a 
negative effect on a company’s performance and value.26 Hence, although we acknowledge that 
RPTs do not necessarily involve tunneling, 27 and that there are other kinds of tunneling in 
addition to RPTs, there is no doubt that RPTs have been behind a number of significant 
corporate scandals.28  
We chose Hong Kong and Singapore as the target markets for several reasons. Both 
markets are leading international financial centers in Asia. Both markets also share the same 
legal heritage and both have largely adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
These factors make the two markets comparable to a certain extent, although there have also 
been differences in their market development that could raise some interesting questions. Both 
jurisdictions have closely followed the OECD principles in adopting their national corporate 
governance codes and both have enacted legislation and listing rules that support the corporate 
governance norms found in these principles. Hong Kong and Singapore also share the common 
trait of having a concentration of ownership in their publicly listed companies,29 thereby raising 
concerns over tunneling by unscrupulous corporate insiders. 30 The World Bank in its Doing 
                                                 
25 Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with a Critique of the 
European Commission Proposal), 16 E.B.O.R. 1, 8 (2015). 
26 E.g. Mark Kohlbeck & Brian W. Mayhew, Valuation of Firms that Disclose Related Party Transactions, 29 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY 115 (2010); Minjung Kang et al., The Association Between Related-
Party Transactions and Control-Ownership Wedge: Evidence from Korea, 29 PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL 
272 (2014); Sung Wook Joh, Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea Before the 
Economic Crisis, 68 J. OF FIN. ECON. 287 (2003); Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Tunneling, Propping, and 
Expropriation: Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong, 82 J. OF FIN. ECON. 343 (2006); Kee-
Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or value added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. OF FIN. 2695 
(2002). 
27 Enriques, supra note 25, at 9. 
28 See, e.g. Grace Leong, Ex-directors of Celestial Nutrifoods being sued, Straits Times (March 16, 2016), 
http://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/ex-directors-of-celestial-nutrifoods-being-sued (last 
visited October 25, 2018) Elaine Henry, Elizabeth A. Gordon, Brad Reed and Timothy Louwers, The Role of 
Related Party Transactions in Fraudulent Financial Reporting, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=993532 (last visited October 25, 2018). 
29 See generally Stijn Claessens et al., The separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. 
OF FIN. ECON. 81 (2000). 
30 See generally Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: 
Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. OF FIN. 1445 (2003). Jiang et al. found that a higher 
shareholding percentage by controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the use of non-operational fund 
occupancy for tunneling. See Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling Through Non-Operational Fund Occupancy: An 
Investigation Based on Officially Identified Activities, 32 J. OF CORP. FIN. 295 (2015). However, there are also 
arguments that concentrated ownership may create value because having corporate control may allow a controller to 
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Business reports provided specific indicators for regulating conflicts of interest.31 Thus, there are 
strong arguments supporting the design of an institutional framework that adequately protects 
minority shareholders from the expropriations of controlling shareholders.32  
 The challenge with regulating RPTs is that they are not unequivocally good or bad. Some 
jurisdictions have chosen to target what they regard as clearly non-beneficial RPTs.33 However, 
some RPTs may also be fair and value-enhancing to a company. 34 For example, a controlling 
shareholder may be willing to lend funds to prop up the company. This kind of RPT may be 
beneficial to the firm as long as the terms of the loan agreement are reasonable and fair.35 In 
other words, RPTs may sometimes be more efficient than transactions with outsiders.36 If that is 
true, then prohibiting all RPTs could cause inefficient results. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to 
distinguish between beneficial and non-beneficial RPTs. 37  Thus, to reduce the chance of 
tunneling, policymakers have not prohibited RPTs outright but have regulated them using several 
regulatory toolkits. 
As will be elaborated in Part II, the OECD principles provide important guiding 
principles to combat tunneling through RPTs. In general, they are divided into disclosure and 
transparency, independent review and approval and giving shareholders an effective means of 
redress. These guiding principles have been implemented in Hong Kong and Singapore through a 
variety of regulatory toolkits, such as corporate governance codes, listing rules and legislation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
pursue his idiosyncratic vision for the firm. See generally Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and 
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016); Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Buy High, Sell Low: How Listed Firms 
Price Asset Transfers in Related Party Transactions, 33 J. OF BANKING AND FINANCE 914 (2009). 
31 World Bank Doing Business, Protecting Minority Investors: Achieving Sound Corporate Governance, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/case-studies/2016/pmi (last visited October 25, 2018). 
32 Michelle Pizzo, Related Party Transactions under a Contingency Perspective, 17 J. OF MANAGEMENT AND 
GOVERNANCE 309, 322 (2013). 
33 Enriques, supra note 25, at 14-15. See also 15 USC 78m(k) for U.S. law prohibiting a listed issuer from extending 
any credit in the form of a personal loan to or for a director or executive officer. 
34 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 785 
(2003); Atanasov et al., supra note 24; Elizabeth A. Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions and Corporate 
Governance, 9 ADVANCES IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 1, 4 (2004); Enriques, supra note 25, at 14. 
35 See generally Eric Friedman et al., Propping and Tunneling, 31 J. OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 732 (2003). 
However, whether such a transaction is for propping up or tunneling may remain to be seen. See generally Winnie 
Qian Peng et al., Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China, 17 J. OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 306 (2011); Cheung et al., supra note 30. Professor Enriques suggests that tunneling, propping and RPTs 
are three partially overlapping circles. Enriques, supra note 25, at 6 note 24. 
36 Pizzo, supra note 32, at 317-318. 
37 Henk Berkman et al., Expropriation Through Loan Guarantees to Related Parties: Evidence from China, 33 J. OF 
BANKING & FINANCE 141, 141 (2009).  
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This article focuses on those regulatory toolkits that are ex ante regimes, that is, they regulate the 
RPTs before they are transacted.  
 The question arises as to whether the current ex ante and process-driven emphasis of the 
regulatory toolkits is appropriate in the context of actual transacted and reported RPTs in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. We contrast this with the ex post approach of giving shareholders an 
effective means of redress. To study this, we empirically examine RPT data collected from the 
annual reports and circulars of a sample of listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. Such 
data were reported pursuant to financial reporting standards based on the IFRS.38 To clarify, this 
article does not attempt to determine whether any specific law reforms in either market have had 
the causal effect of reducing RPTs and tunneling. Instead, we present data to illustrate how RPTs 
are reported and traded in the two markets and reflect on the regulatory strategies (particularly 
corporate governance regimes) adopted in both markets.  
Specifically, we identify four problems from our detailed review of the RPTs. First, there 
is the wide range of RPT types among the listed firms. Often the regulatory framework does not 
distinguish how different types of RPTs are regulated. This raises the question of whether a one-
size fits all approach continues to be appropriate. Second, in Hong Kong, since 2000 there has 
been an increase in the core emphasis on regulating RPTs through the monitoring role of 
independent directors. Thus, we expected the reported RPTs to generally decrease. However, our 
results show a significant increase in reported RPTs from 2009 to 2015. When this is compared 
with the earlier period, 2002-2004, it raises the question of whether relying on the monitoring 
role of independent directors has been an adequate response. Third, the lack of detailed 
disclosures in reporting on RPTs, particularly recurrent RPTs, has not been optimal. Fourth, 
independent directors, who are important gatekeepers, have overwhelmingly relied on the 
opinion of independent financial advisers (IFAs). This is a concern because the IFAs have 
incentives that are not necessarily aligned with the minority shareholders. Therefore, although 
this article does not challenge the utility of improving corporate governance by following 
international standards, adopting transnational corporate governance norms may not be effective 
                                                 
38 See infra Part III.A for a further explanation of the sampling and data collection process. 
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unless they are modified to account for the local characteristics of concentrated ownership and a 
predominance of foreign listings.  
We make several contributions in this article. First, we contribute to the rich academic 
debate on comparative corporate governance and put forth the view that an unqualified adoption 
of the Anglo-American governance model does not always lead to the intended outcomes.39 
Second, this article contributes to the literature on how related party transactions are transacted 
by listed companies based on the information reported, and how firms comply with transnational 
corporate governance norms in practice. The results offer valuable insights into the effectiveness 
of relevant corporate governance norms and provide normative reflections for policymakers 
amid the competition to improve corporate governance standards globally.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part II briefly introduces the three 
main regimes dealing with RPTs, how they connect to international standards and their 
respective issues. It argues that the approaches in Hong Kong and Singapore continue to be 
process-driven and shareholders do not have effective redress. Part III provides evidence of how 
companies in both markets trade RPTs, using empirical data on the number of RPTs transacted in 
a sample of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) and Singapore 
Exchange (SGX). Part IV examines some corporate governance and disclosure practices in both 
markets to identify the problems and offers policy reflections on the regulatory strategies and 
regimes governing RPTs. Part V concludes the article. 
II. Regulating Related Party Transactions: An 
Overview 
 Because it is difficult to distinguish between beneficial and non-beneficial RPTs, the 
OECD principles seek to reduce the possibility of tunneling and enhance the fairness of RPTs by 
suggesting procedural requirements. This part introduces the three main regulatory procedural 
toolkits Hong Kong and Singapore use to control RPTs based on OECD principles: (1) 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006); Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing but Wind?” The Past and Future of 
Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2011); Ann-Marie Anderson & Parveen P. Gupta, 
Corporate Governance: Does One Size Fit All? 24 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE 51 (2013).  
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transparency and disclosure, (2) independent review and approval, and (3) a regulatory 
framework within which shareholders have effective redress. The overall aim is to ensure the 
quality of the approval and to disclose information as necessary to ensure that the board of 
directors or shareholders make informed decisions. 40  This part then briefly examines the 
potential issues with these regimes. Although there have been some incremental revisions over 
time, this regulatory framework has continued to govern RPTs in both markets since 2000. 
A. Transparency and Disclosure 
One important way to reduce tunneling is to improve transparency through mandatory 
disclosures. 41  This approach is supported by internal and external auditing and allows for 
shareholder redress when there is a misstatement of information.42 The literature has shown that 
disclosure can reduce the risk of tunneling.43 The disclosure of RPTs may come from at least two 
sources: accounting standards and listing rules.44 
First, pursuant to accounting standards, listed firms are expected to disclose RPTs in their 
financial statements. Related party disclosures under the IFRS have gone through several rounds 
of reform since their introduction in 1984.45 These rules have become harmonized due to the 
cross-border application of common accounting standards (such as the IFRS). The purpose of 
related party disclosures is to draw investors’ attention to the possibility that a firm’s financial 
position can be affected by the presence of related parties.46 In general, an RPT under the IFRS 
is a transaction (which could be a transfer of resources, services, sale or purchase, etc.) with a 
related party. It involves a wide variety of persons, ranging from individuals who have control or 
significant influence over the company (including key management), to holding companies, 
                                                 
40 OECD principles, supra note 2, at 45. 
41 Enriques, supra note 25, at 21. 
42 Securities and Futures Act ss 200 and 254 (Singapore); Securities and Futures Ordinance ss 108, 277 and 391.  
43 See generally David Buchuk et al., The Internal Capital Markets of Business Groups: Evidence from Intra-Group 
Loans, 112 J. OF FIN. ECON. 190 (2014) (arguing that strict regulation and disclosure requirements have the effect of 
reducing the risk of expropriation through intra-group loans in Chile); Carlo Di Emiliano, Related Party 
Transactions and Separation Between Control and Direction in Business Groups: The Italian Case, 14 CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 58 (2014) (showing that transparency may provide a disincentive to establishing a pyramidal group 
for the purpose of expropriation). 
44 In addition, this article recognizes that there could be other regimes such as tax law or insolvency law on creditor 
protection that could affect RPTs. Atanasov et al., supra note 24, at 10. 
45 IAS, IAS 24 – Related Party Disclosures, https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias24 (last visited October 25, 
2018) 
46 Id.  
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companies within the same group or associates or joint ventures of the company.47 Accounting 
standards require companies to disclose the amount and outstanding balance of such 
transactions.48 The most notable revision to related party disclosures under the IFRS was in 2005. 
At that time, the scope of related party disclosures was expanded to include the compensation of 
key management personnel and state-controlled entities. The definition of “related party” was 
also broadened to cover parties with joint control over the entity, joint ventures in which the 
entity is a venture and the post-employment benefit plans of both employees of the entity and 
close family members of an individual.49  
Second, a listed firm may have to disclose certain RPTs pursuant to listing rules. For 
example, the listing rules of the SGX require a listed company (whether it is registered in 
Singapore or not) to disclose “interested person transactions” (IPT) in its annual report.50 In the 
SEHK, a “connected transaction” (CT) must be disclosed.51  
In short, an IPT is a transaction between a company and interested persons, including the 
directors, chief executive and controlling shareholders and their respective associates. 52 The 
transactions can include the provision or receipt of financial assistance or services, issuance of or 
subscription to securities or options, establishing a joint venture, or selling property units.53 In 
general, a company must immediately announce an IPT if the value of such transaction is equal 
to at least 3% of the group’s last audited net tangible assets.54 The purpose is “to guard against 
the risk that interested persons could influence the [company] to enter into transactions with 
[IPTs] that may adversely affect the interests of the [company].”55 The aggregate value of the 
IPTs should be disclosed in the company’s annual report.56 
                                                 
47 IAS 24.9 and 24.11. 
48 Financial Reporting Standards 24: Related Party Disclosures (2010), at para. [3]. (FRS 24) 
49 Financial Reporting Standards 24: Related Party Disclosures (2005), at p. 4. 
50 SGX Mainboard Rules Chapter 9. (SGX MB Rule) 
51 HKEX Mainboard Listing Rules Chapter 14A. (HK MB Rule) 
52 SGX MB Rule 904(4) and (5). 
53 SGX MB Rules 904(6) and 910. 
54 SGX MB Rules 905 and 917. 
55 SGX MB Rule 901. 
56 SGX MB Rule 907. 
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Under the SEHK’s rules, a CT includes specific types of transactions 57  between a 
company and a “connected person,”58 which is widely defined to include the directors, chief 
executive and substantial shareholders of the company and its subsidiaries; an associate of those 
persons (including family members and a company in which 30% of the shares are held by the 
person); 59  and a connected subsidiary (i.e., a non-wholly-owned subsidiary in which the 
reporting company can exercise 10% or more of the voting power60).61 A company should make 
an announcement of a connected transaction when the terms are agreed to.62 
The scope of disclosure is not identical for accounting standards and listing rules. 
Between the SEHK and SGX listing rules, the definitions of “connected person” and “interested 
person” differ, although there is some common ground. For example, the definition of connected 
persons in Hong Kong is wider than interested persons in Singapore, because the former also 
covers some firms subordinated to the company in addition to key management and substantial 
shareholders. Further, under the SGX rules, an IPT is exempted from disclosure only if its value 
is below a certain threshold. There is no such exemption in the SEHK or under the IFRS. Thus, 
IPT disclosure in the SGX is more limited in scope than the SEHK or accounting standards.63 
B. Independent Review and Approval 
The second way to regulate RPTs is to require approval or review by an independent 
board and in some situations by the shareholders.64 In other words, policymakers seek to regulate 
                                                 
57 A connected transaction includes the following: acquisition and disposal of assets, financial leases, granting 
indemnity or financial assistance, joint ventures, issuing new securities, providing or receiving services, and 
acquiring or providing raw materials, intermediate products or finished goods. HK MB Rule 14A.24. 
58 HK MB Rule 14A.25. 
59 HK MB Rule 14A.12 to 15. 
60 HK MB Rule 14A.16. 
61 HK MB Rule 14A.07. There are also exceptions. See HK MB Rule 14A.09. 
62 HK MB Rule 14A.35. 
63 KPMG and NUS, The Ties that Bind - Interested Person Transactions: Rules and Practices in Singapore (2013), 
at 1, http://governanceforstakeholders.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/The-ties-that-bind-Publication_FINAL.pdf 
(last visited October 25, 2018). However, it should be noted that the Singapore Exchange has recently consulted on 
proposed amendments to remove the exemption for disclosure of transactions below S$100,000. Singapore 
Exchange, Consultation Paper on Enhancements to Continuous Disclosures Consultation Paper on Enhancements 
to Continuous Disclosures (2017), 
http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm/connect/sgx_en/home/regulation_v2/consultations_and_publications/PC/Consultatio
n+Paper+on+Enhancements+to+Continuous+Disclosures (last visited October 25, 2018). As of 28 March 2018, the 
SGX was still considering the feedback it received.  
64 E.g., Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2012 Guidelines 12.1. 
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RPTs through enhanced independent board oversight.65 This is based on the key idea of board 
independence and the audit committee improving the board’s oversight function by underlining 
OECD principles.66 
In a way, board independence has been treated as a popular “cure-all” for maladies ailing 
modern corporations.67 We expect independent directors to exercise a supervisory function to 
ensure the fairness of RPT terms and reduce the chance of tunneling. Further, when RPTs (or at 
least the major ones) are reviewed by “gatekeepers” (such as the audit committee or sometimes 
professionals outside the firm), there may be a deterrence effect, because those who want to 
tunnel may be more reluctant to go through such a process. With an audit committee in charge of 
reviewing financial statements and supervising internal and external audits, the quality of 
disclosures should be ensured. Such gatekeepers should not only help to filter transactions ex 
ante, but also help to monitor RPTs on a continuous basis, post transaction. 
For example, the SEHK requires connected transactions (or mandates for continuing 
connected transactions) to be approved by shareholders at their general meetings, with interested 
shareholders abstaining from voting.68 Before a general meeting, companies should appoint an 
independent financial adviser to make recommendations,69 and an independent board committee 
to advise shareholders on the terms and nature of the connected transactions.70 These safeguards 
are intended to ensure that shareholders have an independent third party’s fair assessment of the 
transactions. Continuing connected transactions are also subject to mandatory annual review by 
independent directors and auditors.71  
 In Singapore, the SGX requires an IPT to be approved by shareholders if the value of the 
transaction is at least 5% of the company’s audited net tangible assets.72 As in Hong Kong, the 
SGX allows listed firms to seek a general mandate from shareholders for recurrent IPTs of a 
revenue or trading nature or those necessary to day-to-day operations. Detailed information is 
                                                 
65 Atanasov et al., supra note 24, at 10. 
66 OECD principles, supra note 2, at 16.  
67 Adam C. Pritchard, Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors, 9 J. OF KOREAN L. 1, 1 (2009). 
68 HK MB Rule 14A.36 and 37. 
69 HK MB Rule 14A.44. 
70 HK MB Rule 14A.40. 
71 HK MB Rule 14A.55. 
72 SGX MB Rule 906(1). 
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specified in a circular issued to the shareholders before a general meeting. 73 The objective 
appears to be the reduction of compliance costs so that firms can avoid having to seek approval 
for ordinary commercial dealings. Nonetheless, such a mandate could potentially open a 
backdoor for management or controlling owners to hide transactions under a shareholder 
mandate.74 
C. Allowing Shareholders to Have Effective Redress 
 The most important form of effective redress is to allow shareholders to bring actions 
against wrongdoers for compensation. Such redress is an ex post regulatory toolkit that may also 
deter wrongdoing. If a director engages in tunneling, it is a breach of his or her duty unless the 
transaction has been properly approved. Both Hong Kong and Singapore follow the English 
common law tradition in which the directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company. If there is any 
conflict of interest, a director must disclose it to the company and seek approval from the board 
before proceeding with the transaction.75 Otherwise, he or she could be in breach of the duty to 
disclose, with legal consequences that include a range of civil liabilities.76 Some duties have also 
been codified into statutes. 77  These laws provide some constraints on a corporate insider’s 
tunneling behavior. In the U.S., for example, a controlling shareholder may owe a fiduciary duty 
to the company or its minority shareholders.78 However, it is worth noting that a controlling or 
substantial shareholder does not owe a fiduciary duty to the company or other shareholders under 
Singapore or Hong Kong law.79 Moreover, expanding the shareholders’ ability to obtain redress 
has not been effective. In our prior work, we have shown that public enforcement has often been 
more important, with private enforcement playing a secondary role in both Hong Kong and 
Singapore.80  
                                                 
73 SGX MB Rule 920(1). 
74 See infra Part IV.E. 
75 See Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18-19 (per Millet J). 
76 See, e.g., Companies Act (Cap 50) s 157(3) (Singapore). 
77 E.g., see Companies Act (Cap 50) ss 156 and 157 (Singapore). 
78 E.g., Jones v HF Ahmanson & Co 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969); Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc 638 
A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Sinclair Oil Corp v. Levien 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
79 For a comparative analysis, see generally Ernest Lim, Controlling Shareholders and Fiduciary Duties in Asia, 
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 113 (2017). 
80 See generally Wai Yee Wan et al., Public and Private Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws: An 
Empirical Comparison of Hong Kong and Singapore (forthcoming in E.B.O.R) at 19, 21 and 29,  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3149367 (last visited October 25, 2018). 
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D. General Problems with the Ex Ante and Process-driven 
Approaches 
Ideally, the three main regimes should be sufficient to reduce tunneling through RPTs. 
However, it is debatable whether individually or collectively they have been truly effective at 
deterring tunneling. Even in the U.S., some of the regimes mentioned above have been described 
as weak or moderate.81 Without further detailed legal analysis, this section offers some general 
criticism of the ex ante and process-driven approaches to RPT.82 Our criticism relates to the 
belief that better corporate governance (underlining the adoption of transnational corporate 
governance standards) can address agency problems in the Asian context.  
First, disclosures may not be wholly accurate or reliable, raising concerns over the quality 
of RPT disclosures. 83  Whether a transaction is reported may sometimes depend on the 
company’s discretionary assessment.84 Further, how data is reported affects the way information 
is conveyed to the market participants. For example, within a group of companies, it may not be 
necessary to disclose information on an RPT in a consolidated financial statement.85 Even in the 
U.S., large corporations may not effectively disclose self-dealing.86 Therefore, the market may 
not be fully informed.  
Second, knowing how to effectively audit RPTs may pose another problem,87 because the 
nature of tunneling implies that wrongdoers are more likely to hide their dealings. This issue may 
further impact the quantity and quality of the information revealed not only to shareholders and 
prospective investors but also to independent directors and the audit committee reviewing RPTs. 
Annual reports often give blanket assurances that all RPTs have been conducted on fair terms, 
                                                 
81 Atanasov et al., supra note 24, at 49-50. 
82 For clarification, this article does not examine issues regarding enforcement and liability rules, which deserve 
another separate paper for full analysis. 
83 See generally Cynthia Utama & Sidharta Utama, Determinants of Disclosure Level of Related Party Transactions 
in Indonesia, 11 INT’L J. OF DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNANCE 74 (2014); Agnes W.Y. Lo et al., Can Corporate 
Governance Deter Management from Manipulating Earnings? Evidence from Related-Party Sales Transactions in 
China, 16 J. OF CORPORATE FINANCE 225 (2010); Geeyoung Min, The SEC and the Courts’ Cooperative Policing of 
Related Party Transactions, 2014 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV. 663 (2014). 
84 Enriques, supra note 25, at 21. 
85 Atanasov et al., supra note 24, at 15. 
86 Atanasov et al., supra note 24, at 41. 
87 Gordon et al. also suggested that more independent directors might improve the quality of RPT audits. Gordon et 
al., supra note 34, at 93-94. 
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often without further elaboration that would enable meaningful evaluation by investors and 
shareholders. Whether those statements are true may again depend on the management and the 
quality of auditing. 
Third, the effectiveness of shareholder approval depends partly on whether minority 
shareholders have a real opportunity to vote for the interests of the company after a well-
informed decision-making process. 88  Therefore, it is imperative that shareholders be given 
sufficient and appropriate information before a general meeting. In practice, however, 
shareholders may not always vote with the interests of the company in mind or they may not vote 
on an informed basis (e.g., inability to evaluate the information provided).89 The assumption that 
shareholders are able to make good decisions on individual business transactions 90 may not 
always be correct. 
Fourth, the effectiveness of board independence and audit committee review may also be 
compromised. One underlying assumption of the board independence regime is that independent 
directors are not only truly independent but are also competent to effectively perform their 
function. One or both assumptions could be false.91 For example, in small jurisdictions like Hong 
Kong or Singapore, it is not uncommon for businessmen or professionals to be connected 
through family, business or social networks. This could undermine their independence if they 
serve as independent directors. 92  Because independent directors are still elected at general 
meetings (and the controlling shareholders may vote at these meetings) the controlling 
shareholders may have the ability to select candidates they prefer or remove undesirable 
directors if the law allows it.93 The criteria for deciding whether a director is independent, and 
who is responsible for this decision, are critical to ensuring the integrity of the board 
                                                 
88 Enriques, supra note 25, at 16. 
89 Id. 
90 Enriques, supra note 25, at 17. 
91 Enriques, supra note 25, at 18. 
92 See generally Zihan Niu & Christopher Chen, Social Capital of Directors and Corporate Governance: A Social 
Network Analysis, 11 BROOKLYN J. OF CORP. FIN. AND COMMERCIAL L. 343 (2017). 
93 Companies Act s 152 (Singapore); Companies Ordinance s 462 (Hong Kong). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331814 
 16 
 
 
independence regime.94 In other words, a regime requiring approval by independent directors 
could create a “risk to shareholders if the board is co-opted or asleep.”95 
How independent directors are involved in the decision-making process could also make 
a difference. Their impact is much weaker when they only offer non-binding advice. However, 
the case is different when the rule requires RPTs to be approved not only by the board but also 
by a majority of the independent directors.96 As with shareholder approval, the extent to which 
independent directors are well-informed plays an important role.97 
In addition to the above, research on the role of independent financial advisers in 
takeover offers has shown that they may rely on non-standard methodologies for valuation. 
Because they are entitled to choose the methodology, they may be subject to bias that may not be 
easily detected.98 This could apply to independent financial advisers evaluating IPTs or CTs in 
Singapore and Hong Kong respectively.99 
 Part III provides more insight on how listed firms trade RPTs and makes some general 
observations. Part IV further considers the different regulatory regimes and how compliance with 
them may reflect on the number of RPTs disclosed and transacted.  
III. The Contour of Related Party Transactions  
 In this part, empirical evidence is offered on Hong Kong and Singapore’s RPTs from 
2002-2004 and 2009-2015. The inquiry is not about how RPTs are regulated in the books but 
how companies conduct RPTs in practice following a series of corporate governance reforms 
based on OECD principles. The data helps us examine the effectiveness of current regulatory 
regimes. This part first explains the source of the data and dataset design, then provides some 
general data on RPTs reported in financial statements in both markets.  
                                                 
94 Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. J 
COMP. L. 1, 27 (2011). 
95 Atanasov et al., supra note 24 (2011), at p. 11. 
96 Enrique, supra note 25, at 19. 
97 Enrique, supra note 25, at 19. 
98 Wai Yee Wan, Independent Financial Advisers’ Opinions for Public Takeovers and Related Party Transactions in 
Singapore, 30 COMPANY AND SECURITIES LAW JOURNAL 32, 42 (2012). 
99 Id. 
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A. Dataset Design 
 We constructed two databases for Hong Kong and Singapore. One dataset comprised a 
random sample of 25% of the firms listed in the Hong Kong and Singapore stock markets at the 
beginning of 2002 (and were still listed by the end of 2004). From this, data were retrieved on 
157 firms listed in Hong Kong and 51 firms listed in Singapore, for a total of 208 firms and 624 
firm-year observations. The other dataset randomly sampled 25% of the firms listed in Hong 
Kong and Singapore from 2009 to 2015.100 It resulted in a sample of 103 firms from Singapore 
and 254 firms from Hong Kong for a total of 357 firms and 2,499 firm-year observations. We 
sampled only 25% because the coding exercise required us to handpick non-standardized 
information from financial statements. The reason for the difference in time spans (three years vs. 
seven years) was practicality, because many annual reports before 2002 were unavailable. To 
address the problem, we restricted the timeframe for the 2002-04 dataset to three years, even 
though we recognized that doing so would limit the power of any inference we might draw from 
the data. 
In each dataset, we collected data on firm characteristics (e.g., place of registration, year 
listed), corporate governance benchmarks (e.g., board size or number of independent directors), 
and financial data for each fiscal year within the coverage period (including total assets, revenue, 
etc.) and finally, the RPTs extracted from the notes to financial statements for each company. We 
manually collected data on the number of RPTs from the annual reports because there was no 
publicly available centralized information on the level of RPTs in either Singapore or Hong 
Kong. In both markets, the companies did not disclose the number of their related party 
transactions. Thus, we only focused on the number of RPTs reported in the financial statements. 
Because both markets followed the IFRS, we believed that the data collected from them would 
generally be comparable. Conversely, because the content and methods of reporting differed 
significantly, data regarding connected transactions in Hong Kong and the equivalent of 
interested person transactions in Singapore were not quite comparable.  
 Why did we construct two separate datasets rather than a single dataset covering the span 
from 2002 to 2015? Our reasons are threefold. First, the IFRS revised the related party disclosure 
                                                 
100 We sampled the companies that were listed at the beginning of 2009 and were still listed by 2015 based on the 
list of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong downloaded from Capital IQ. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331814 
 18 
 
 
rules, effective from 2005.101 Second, we attempted to avoid the impact of the global financial 
crisis of 2007-08, which may have caused significant fluctuations in our sampled firms’ 
performance. Third, constructing two datasets allowed us to observe one important phenomenon 
since 2006: an influx of Chinese initial public offerings and secondary listings in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. As a result, there were far fewer listed firms in 2002 than in 2009 in both markets. 
Further, a sample selected from the companies listed in 2002 might not be representative post 
2008 global financial crisis. Thus, our trade-off was to construct two separate datasets with 
different compositions of firms. The authors are fully aware that the study design means drawing 
any statistical inferences between the two datasets would be difficult, considering the change in 
accounting standards and revisions to the corporate governance rules in each time frame.  
B. Total Amount of Related Party Transactions 
In general, we observed that the mean (average) of the total number of RPTs102 reported 
in the financial statements (total RPTs) in both markets appeared to be higher in the period 2009-
15 than they were in 2002-04, as shown in Figure 1 below. This illustrates the distribution and 
centrality of the total number of RPTs (denominated in U.S. dollars in millions).103 In Hong 
Kong, the mean (average) of all observations of RPTs was US$18.48 million for 2002-04; 
however, the mean rose significantly to US$399.46 million for 2009-15. Likewise, in Singapore, 
the mean in 2009-15 (US$111.90 million) was much higher than in 2002-04 (US$ 63.31 million).  
                                                 
101 See supra Part II.A. 
102 The total amount reported in this section does not include key management compensation or the balance of RPTs 
at the end of the fiscal year.  
103 The data in both periods are highly skewed, and therefore we present the RPT distribution in Figure 1 with 
logged figures. 
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Figure 1  Total Related Party Transactions  
 
 
Figure 1 also shows that the box for 2009-15 is clearly in a higher position than it is in 
2002-04 for Hong Kong, indicating a significant increase in the number of RPTs after the global 
financial crisis. This finding is supported by a comparison of data from each quantile.104 In 
contrast, Singapore shows a different pattern. Although the mean for the total RPTs is still higher 
in 2009-15, the median value for the period 2009-15 is lower than the earlier period (US$0.86 
million in 2009-15 vs. US$1.24 million in 2002-04).105 Figure 1 also supports the observation 
that the boxes in both periods are largely in the same band. Thus, the higher mean in 2009-15 in 
Singapore could be the result of some extremely large observations.  
The increase of the total number of RPTs in Hong Kong between the two periods may be 
explained by two factors: the change to accounting standards and the arrival of large Chinese 
initial public offerings. The change to the IFRS for related party disclosures in 2005 may explain 
the rise in the total number of RPTs, at least in Hong Kong. It is beyond the scope of this article 
to empirically examine the potential effect of the 2005 revision to the IFRS on related party 
                                                 
104 In Hong Kong, we found that the 25% quantile was US$0.004 million for 2002-04 and US$0.084 for 2009-15. If 
we compare the median for the period, it is merely US$0.78 million for 2002-04 and US$2.50 million for 2009-15, 
much smaller than the mean. For the 75% quantile, it is US$9.30 million for 2002-04 and 37.06 million for 2009-15. 
105 If we compare the data for each quantile, the Singapore data for both periods are comparable up to the 75% 
quantile (US$6.31 million for 2009-15 as opposed to US$7.00 million for 2002-04). 
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disclosures of the number of RPTs reported. However, an international accounting firm in Hong 
Kong commented that the 2005 revision only had a moderate impact on Hong Kong.106 Because 
related party disclosures were simpler in 2002-04, it hampered the ability to make direct 
comparisons between the two periods. Thus, how far the revision to the accounting rule accounts 
for the increase in Hong Kong RPTs is unclear.  
 The increase in the total number of RPTs in Hong Kong may also be partly explained by 
the arrival of many large Chinese listings. One sharp contrast before and after the global 
financial crisis was the rise in Chinese firms making initial public offerings in the Hong Kong 
market after 2006. Pursuant to the Hong Kong Exchange website, there were 226 H-share 
companies listed on the Mainboard of the SEHK at the end of 2017. Among these, 139 
companies were listed on or after 1 January 2006.107 Given that more large Chinese firms were 
listed in 2009-15, it could explain the increase in RPT levels in Hong Kong.  
In contrast, the lack of a significant rise in Singapore’s RPT level might offer a counter-
argument that the increase in Hong Kong was due to the change in accounting standards, because 
both markets were affected by the same accounting rule change. However, because the random 
sampling of firms listed in Singapore did not include firms registered in China, we declined to 
draw much inference from our Singapore sample on the impact of overseas listings by Chinese 
firms in Singapore. 
In addition, a considerable number of firms in both markets reported no RPTs in all or 
some years. In 2002-04, about 24% of the observations in either market reported no RPTs at all. 
In 2009-15, about 19% of the observations in either market reported no RPTs. This disparity 
might challenge policymakers attempting to maintain a balance between the regulatory regimes 
for RPTs and compliance costs, given that some firms have an extraordinarily large number of 
RPTs and many others have none.  
Figure 2 below displays a pattern in which the larger the company was, the more the total 
number of RPTs (coefficient=0.915, p<0.001). We can also identify a positive correlation 
                                                 
106 Deloitte, IMPLEMENTING HONG KONG FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS: THE CHALLENGE FOR 2005, at 120 
(2005), https://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/dttpubs/0508hongkong.pdf (last visited October 25, 2018).  
107 Hong Kong Exchange, China Dimension, http://www.hkex.com.hk/Market-Data/Statistics/Consolidated-
Reports/China-Dimension?sc_lang=en&tabName=Main%20Board# (last visited October 25, 2018). 
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between a firm’s annual revenue and total RPTs (coefficient=0.827, p<0.001). The trend is 
similar if we analyze each period separately or examine each market separately.  
Figure 2 Total Assets and Total Amount of Related Party Transactions 
 
 
To summarize, after a series of corporate governance reforms, a substantial number of 
RPTs were still entered into by listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. Arguably there 
were more RPTs in terms of total transaction amounts in Hong Kong after the global financial 
crisis of 2008, whereas in Singapore it appeared to be quite stable. The total amount of RPTs 
could be partially explained by the a company’s size in terms of its total assets, because the 
proportion of total RPTs to total assets appeared to be relatively stable between the two periods 
in the two markets.  
This finding prompted two questions. First, does it mean that RPTs are not as widespread 
as has been feared? Second, what could be the implications for RPT regulatory strategies if 
larger companies tend to have more RPTs? We reflect on those two questions in Part IV. 
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C. Types of Related Party Transactions 
This article considers different types of transactions. However, the accounting standards 
do not provide a standardized method for defining types of transactions. Instead, they only offer 
a list of possible transactions as examples, such as purchases or sales of goods, rendering or 
receiving services, leases and transfers under finance arrangements or guarantees. 108  This 
approach avoids the issue of defining transactions when a single transaction can fall within 
multiple categories at the same time (e.g., sale and lease back). Because we have no means of 
examining the details of a deal other than those disclosed in the financial statements, we can only 
rely on the description provided by the reporting company. 
This article found more non-financing RPTs than financing RPTs when RPTs were 
classified into two such broad categories. Financing RPTs include loans to or from a company, 
deposits and placing or receiving investments. These transactions directly involve cash inflow or 
outflow to or from the company (or subsidiaries) that is not in exchange for other goods or 
services. Non-financing transactions include sales and purchases and the offer or provision of 
services or leases that are not for financing purposes.  
In Hong Kong, our data shows that the mean (average) of non-financing RPTs was 
US$442.46 million (median = 4.95 million) in 2009-15 and 16.23 million (median value = 0.78 
million) in 2002-04. In contrast, the mean (average) was US$50.22 million (median = 0.38 
million) for financing RPTs in 2009-15 and 5.96 million (median value = 0.10 million) for 2002-
04. In Singapore, the mean (average) of non-financing RPTs for 2009-15 was US$120.20 million 
(median value = 1.17 million) and US$33.21 million (median = 2.69 million) for 2002-04. In 
contrast, the mean (average) was US$16.82 million (median value = 0.07 million) for financing 
RPT in 2009-15 with a mean of US$50.29 million (median value = 0.11 million) for 2002-04. If 
we convert this into percentage terms, financing RPTs amounted to an average of 10.8% of total 
RPTs (in terms of amount) in Hong Kong in 2002-04 and about 10.3% in 2009-15. In Singapore, 
financing RPTs amounted to about 2.3% in 2002-04 and 9.3% in 2009-15. Thus, in general we 
have seen more non-financing RPTs than financing RPTs in both markets. This is a sensible 
result given that most of the sampled firms were not banks or other financial institutions.  
                                                 
108 FRS 24, supra note 48, at para. [21]. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331814 
 23 
 
 
One point to note is that the proportion of different transactions could differ greatly 
among firms. For example, a bank might have more loans or deposits with related parties than 
non-financing RPTs, whereas a consumer product company would most likely have more sales 
with related parties. The dynamics of RPTs within a business group could also change depending 
on economic conditions. For example, a study of Chinese business groups showed that a firm 
could engage in more loan-based RPTs with a controller if the latter experienced a credit crunch 
and there were more non-loan-based RPTs when the listed firm’s performance dipped.109  
In our sample, among all the observations, regardless of the market or period, about 53% 
of the 3,123 firm-year observations involved RPTs providing or receiving services (other than 
finance). About 55% were sales or purchases of goods or properties, and about 45% involved 
leases or rentals. Financing RPTs can be broadly divided into two categories: those resulting in 
cash inflow into the company (i.e., borrowing or taking money from related parties) or those 
resulting in cash outflow (e.g., lending to related parties). Financing RPTs occurred far less often 
than non-financing RPTs. If all firm-year observations are counted, only about 22% of the 
observations had related borrowing and about 22% had related lending. Therefore, a variety of 
RPT combinations were traded by firms. A clear pattern was not identified.  
It is challenging to judge whether a specific type of RPT is more prone to tunneling 
without other robust evidence. It all depends on the transaction terms and how the parties handle 
cash flow during the life of the transaction. This article does not rely on income or expense as a 
pure benchmark for tunneling. For example, a company may sell a property to a controlling 
shareholder. This transaction represents cash income for the company, but it could also be 
tunneling if the sales price is unjustifiably lower than the market rate. Therefore, although it is 
commendable that companies reveal the nature of their transactions (e.g., sale, lease, loan, etc.), 
it is unclear how much useful information is disclosed to the market through related party 
disclosures. 
                                                 
109 See generally Nan Jia et al., Coinsurance within Business Groups: Evidence from Related Party Transactions in 
an Emerging Market, 59 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 2295 (2013). 
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D. Types of Related Parties  
A further point to analyze is the amount of RPTs transacted with different related parties. 
Because we recorded data from consolidated financial statements, transactions with subsidiaries 
were consolidated and reported accordingly. Although some companies also reported RPTs at 
the company level, most reported only RPT data on a consolidated basis. Thus, this article cannot 
provide a systemic analysis of RPTs transacted with subsidiaries. 
There are some challenges to analyzing related parties. Some (such as the management or 
controlling shareholders) may be disguised. For example, a controlling shareholder could enter 
into a sale of goods agreement with a company in his own name (or in the name of his spouse). 
He could also enter the same transaction through a shell company that he fully controls. It is 
often challenging to see through the veils of an ownership structure hidden behind a pyramid of 
holding companies that are occasionally clouded by cross-shareholdings. Without further details 
(which are often not fully disclosed), it may be fruitless to simply look at nominally related 
counterparties.110 
One crude benchmark is to deduct RPTs with associates or joint ventures from the total 
number of RPTs. By definition, associate companies and joint ventures are entities in which the 
reporting company has some degree of ownership but not full control.111 Thus, arguably RPTs 
with these affiliations would be less likely to involve tunneling and more likely to be normal 
business dealings if they are not otherwise owned by a controlling shareholder or key 
management.112 In contrast, it is harder to evaluate whether an RPT amounts to tunneling if it 
involves a holding company or other group of companies with the same ultimate ownership.   
Due to the dearth of information in many of the annual reports from 2002-04, this article 
can only present data from 2009-15. For 2009-15, our data shows that on average 74.83% of the 
                                                 
110 It is noted that in the recent consultation, SGX proposed that for IPTs the listing rules should be amended to 
require additional disclosure in the annual report of the relationship between the interested person and the company. 
Singapore Exchange, supra note 63.  
111 Under the IFRS, an associate is an entity in which an investor has significant influence (by holding 20% or more 
of the voting power) but no control or joint control. See IAS 28, https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias28 
(last visited October 25, 2018). A joint venture is “a contractual arrangement whereby two or more parties undertake 
an economic activity that is subject to joint control.” See IAS 31, https://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias31 
(last visited October 25, 2018).  
112 In our sample and coding, we treated an associate or joint venture as a company linked to management, 
controlling shareholders or holding companies, etc. if they owned a significant stake in the associate or joint venture. 
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total RPTs in Hong Kong and 79.06% in Singapore were with related parties other than 
associates or joint ventures. In terms of the sheer amount, the mean was US$317.47 million in 
Hong Kong (although the median was merely US$0.62 million) and US$63.91 million in 
Singapore (with the median only US$0.32 million).  
 In addition, there were far fewer direct transactions with key management personnel or 
associated persons (including other related individuals or entities controlled by key management 
personnel), if they were not otherwise controlling shareholders. In 2009-15, the mean of the total 
RPTs with key management and associated persons was barely US$4.55 million in Hong Kong 
(median = US$0) and US$0.97 million in Singapore (median = US$0), representing only a tiny 
fraction of the total RPTs. We also note that the super-majority of firms in both markets did not 
have any RPTs with key management (and associated persons).  
In sum, the result shows that a super-majority of RPTs were with holding companies (and 
their associated companies) rather than individual shareholders or key management personnel. 
This article explores the implications of regulatory strategies for RPTs in Part IV below.  
E. Interested Person Transactions and Connected 
Transactions 
 In addition to the RPTs reported in the financial statements pursuant to accounting 
standards, another data source relied on is related to interested person transactions (IPTs) in 
Singapore and connected transactions (CTs) in Hong Kong reported in the listing rules. Due to 
the different ways of reporting and the difference in exchanges, we evaluated the IPTs and CTs 
in the two markets in different ways. 
 In Hong Kong, we had a total of 683 circulars (107 in 2002-04 and 576 in 2009-15) for 
the CTs obtained from filings on the SEHK. Among the 683 circulars, 252 (36.9%) related to 
continuing CTs. Thus, over one-third of the CT circulars related to continuing transactions in 
which shareholders could mandate authorization for the management to trade without separately 
seeking approval for each individual transaction. In 2002-04, only 12.15% (13 out of 107) of the 
circulars pertained to continuing CTs, whereas in 2009-15 it was 41.49% (230 out of 576). Thus, 
it seems there was a wider use of mandates for continuing CTs in Hong Kong post 2008 global 
financial crisis. 
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 In Singapore, 553 firm-year observations (out of a total of 874, or about 63%) reported 
IPTs (including 119 for 2002-04 and 434 for 2009-15). In addition, 143 out of 553 observations 
(about 26%) reported IPTs under a shareholder mandate (similar to Hong Kong’s mandate for 
continuing CTs). In terms of the amount, in 2002-04, the mean of the total IPTs transacted was 
US$40.44 million (median = 0.57 million), whereas the mean of the total IPTs in 2009-15 was 
US$70.04 million (median = 0.12 million). Although the mean was higher in 2009-15, the data 
shows that the level of total IPTs was lower in 2009-15 than in 2002-04 (p=0.003). This is 
consistent with the pattern of total RPTs reported in Figure 1 above. For continuing IPTs, if only 
those observations with IPTs are counted, the mean is US$41.16 million (median = 0) in 2002-04 
and US$117.66 million (median = 0) in 2009-15. However, some companies had an 
extraordinarily large number of continuing IPTs in certain years (e.g., the largest observation was 
US$6,371.6 million), even though a significant number of firms had no continuing IPTs at all. 
This result, on the one hand, shows that continuing IPTs could pose problems for certain firms. 
On the other hand, no continuing IPTs occurred in several firms. Due to the wide variety of IPTs 
and CTs and the absolute values that were involved, it might not have been easy for the stock 
exchange to insist on firms following a consistent one size fits all rule relating to the disclosure 
of these transactions without imposing an excessive regulatory burden on the companies.  
 In sum, a significant portion of CTs and IPTs pertained to continuing transactions. The 
problem with this is that the shareholders had no ability to track and monitor once a mandate was 
passed except to receive aggregate information in the annual reports. By definition, this means 
that the transaction had already been completed. Continued monitoring conducted by the board 
of directors (specifically the audit committee) and auditors. There was also a lack of 
transparency because the companies did not report the details of continuing CTs or IPTs. This 
potentially created a backdoor for the management or controlling shareholders to exploit. In 2017, 
the SGX proposed that transparency in IPTs be improved by requiring firms to disclose the 
nature of their relationship with interested persons.113 However, it can be debated whether such a 
proposal went far enough because the parties were still not required to disclose the exact 
                                                 
113 Singapore Exchange, supra note 63, at 16. 
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relationship in more detail other than to provide a broad categorization (e.g., an associate of the 
issuer’s controlling shareholder114). 
F. Summary 
 The data presented above show that there were a significant number of RPTs (or IPTs or 
CTs) in Singapore and Hong Kong for the two periods of the study. In terms of the number of 
RPTs, in Hong Kong the volume was higher in 2009-15 than in 2004-04, after a flurry of large 
Chinese listings over the previous decade. We found a variety of RPT combinations in terms of 
the nature of the transactions, but there appeared to be no common pattern. Regarding the nature 
of the related parties, there was a lack of sufficient information for 2002-04. However, the 2009-
15 data showed that a super-majority of RPTs were transacted with holding companies (or their 
subsidiaries or associates) or to a lesser extent key management (and associated persons) in both 
markets. For CTs and IPTs, we found that a significant proportion of those transactions were 
continuing transactions authorized by shareholder mandates. On this basis, Part IV reflects on 
adopting transnational corporate governance codes and regulatory strategies for RPTs in Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  
IV. Reflections on the Implementation of 
Transnational Corporate Governance on Related 
Party Transactions 
A. Board Independence and Tunneling 
In theory, enhancing board independence should detect and deter wrongdoing carried out 
through RPTs. Considering that both Hong Kong and Singapore have progressively enhanced 
their corporate governance standards over the past two decades,115 it is reasonable to expect that 
                                                 
114 Singapore Exchange, supra note 63, at 16. 
115 For a brief history of amendments to the corporate governance codes in both markets, see Wai Yee Wan et al., 
Managing the Risk of Corporate Fraud: The Evidence from Hong Kong and Singapore, 48 HONG KONG L.J. 125, 
140-146 (2018); Christopher Chen et al., Board Independence as a Panacea to Tunneling? An Empirical Study of 
Related Party Transactions in Hong Kong and Singapore, 15 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 987, 990-992 
(2018). 
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the corporate governance records from the 2009-15 sample would be better than the 2002-04 
sample. A comparison is given in Table 1 below.  
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Major Corporate Governance Benchmarks 
Panel 1A Hong Kong 
Mean (median) of 2002-04 2009-15 
Total number of observations 471 1,778 
Board size 8.33 (8) 8.97 (9) 
Number of independent directors 2.68 (3) 3.53 (3) 
Proportion of independent directors 
on the board 
33.98% (33.33%) 41.00% (37.5%) 
Size of audit committee 2.70 (3) 3.37 (3) 
Percentage of observations with 
chairman-CEO duality 
36.39% 26.46% 
Shareholding interest of largest 
beneficial owner (%) 
46.23% (45.89%) 45.98% (46.87%) 
 
Panel 1B Singapore 
Mean (median) of 2002-04 2009-15 
Total number of observations 153 721 
Board size 7.63 (7) 7.00 (7) 
Number of independent directors 3.62 (3) 3.38 (3) 
Proportion of independent directors 
on the board 
47.09% (42.86%) 48.86% (50%) 
Size of audit committee 3.24 (3) 3.25 (3) 
Percentage of observations with 
chairman-CEO duality 
37.88% 33.38% 
Shareholding interest of largest 
beneficial owner (%) 
41.19% (39.81%) 40.72% (39.62%) 
 
There are several observations we can make regarding compliance with the directorial 
independence requirements in the corporate governance codes for both markets. First, there was 
high compliance. In 2009-15, all firms in our Singapore sample generally complied with the 
minimum 1/3 board independence threshold over the period. Even in 2002-04, only about 2% of 
the observations in Singapore failed to meet the minimum 1/3 threshold, notwithstanding that the 
Code of Corporate Governance 2001 only became effective in 2003. In Hong Kong, over 80% of 
the sampled firms were already in compliance with the minimum threshold by 2009. Thus, very 
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few firms changed board composition in response to the minimum 1/3 threshold prescribed by 
the revision to the Code of Corporate Governance Practices in 2012. In 2002-04, all firms in the 
Hong Kong sample had a minimum of two independent directors on their boards, complying 
with the minimum requirement applicable at the time.116 Therefore, it appears that the companies 
complied with the board independence requirements without undue difficulty. This offers prima 
facie evidence that the implementation of transnational corporate governance standards worked 
well without placing an undue burden on the market participants. 
Second, most companies only complied with the minimum requirement related to 
directorial independence. In Hong Kong, about 24% of the observations in 2009-15 and 14% in 
2002-04 had a majority independent board. Most firms managed to pitch the board independence 
level just enough to meet the minimum requirement. In Singapore, the proportion of observations 
with a majority independent board was higher, with about 43% in 2002-04 and 52% in 2009-15. 
Therefore, Singaporean firms appear to have been more willing to bring independent directors 
onto their boards, although about half the observations continued to show a pattern similar to 
Hong Kong. In sum, although most companies did not appear to have a problem complying with 
the board independence standard, the evidence suggests that most were not keen to comply 
beyond the minimum requirement. 
Third, the chairman-CEO (chief executive officer) duality remained a problem. Despite 
the recommendation in both markets’ corporate governance codes, that the roles of the chairman 
and CEO be separated, Table 1 shows that over one-third of the observations in Singapore had a 
chairman and CEO who were the same person. In Hong Kong, the situation improved after the 
global financial crisis. These findings are consistent with other surveys from Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 117  Therefore, the boards of most companies may still incur the risk of having 
insufficient checks on the executive chairman who, more often than not, would have been 
                                                 
116 The Hong Kong Stock Exchanged prescribed a minimum of two independent directors as early as 1993. The 
minimum number was later increased to three in 2004.  
117 A report in Hong Kong found that only 67.4% of the Mainboard listed companies had separate roles for the 
Chairman and CEO in 2012. See Lee Kha Loon and Kurt Schacht, Board Governance- How Independent are 
Boards in Hong Kong Main Board Companies (2012), at 1, https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/advocacy/policy-
positions/board-governance-how-independent-are-boards-in-hong-kong-main-board-companies (last visited October 
25, 2018). In Singapore, a survey showed that only 71.6% of listed firms separated the roles of the two offices. See 
Singapore Institute of Directors, The Singapore Directorship Report 2016, at 6, 
https://www.sid.org.sg/Web/Resources/Singapore_Directorship_Report_2016.aspx (last visited October 25, 2018). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331814 
 30 
 
 
appointed by the controlling shareholders. This could potentially affect the ability of the board to 
make objective decisions on RPTs. In turn, this issue could affect the overall effectiveness of the 
board independence regime for reducing tunneling. 
Fourth, Table 1 shows no obvious change to the level of shareholding interests held by 
the largest beneficial owner between the two periods. In Hong Kong, the largest beneficial 
interests were on average over 45% in both periods, and in Singapore they were all over 40%. 
On the one hand, the data supports the general observation that listed firms in both markets had 
concentrated ownership. Although concentrated ownership can be present in well run firms, it 
does indicate that the risk of tunneling could still be very substantial. The question is whether 
under corporate governance reforms, if controlling shareholders find it more difficult to tunnel 
(and obtain benefits exceeding their economic interest), they will begin to reduce their 
shareholdings over time. As seen in Table 1, it appears that based on the OECD principles, the 
revisions to corporate governance codes in both markets before and after the financial crisis did 
not in general have an impact on the degree of concentrated ownership. Thus, although adopting 
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance standards might have changed the 
composition of boards of directors or their sub-committees, the evidence suggests that there was 
no fundamental change to the underlying control and ownership structure. The risk of tunneling 
could have remained significant because of the continuing high degree of concentrated 
ownership. This is worth policymakers pondering for future reforms.   
Overall, the key question is whether better corporate governance can reduce tunneling. If 
so, this would justify the universal adoption of corporate governance standards illustrated by the 
OECD principles. It is beyond the scope of this article to present a full data analysis identifying 
whether better corporate governance (in terms of board independence) would have a negative 
effect on the amount of tunneling. Identifying causation is a complex question that requires 
comprehensive research and modelling to determine the potential causal effects of corporate 
governance reforms on tunneling. Another study by the authors based on the 2009-15 data 
showed that the 2012 reform in Hong Kong, in which a minimum one-third board independence 
threshold was imposed, did not appear to have a causal effect on the level of RPTs. This was 
based on a comparison between firms that changed board composition due to the rule change and 
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firms that were already in compliance with the standard.118 However, the lack of findings might 
have resulted from the SEHK being consulted on the rule change after 2010, so that the 2012 rule 
change was neither very strong nor a clean exogenous shock. In Singapore, the event took place 
in 2003, when the Code of Corporate Governance 2001 became effective. However, even in our 
sample of Singapore listed firms from 2002-04, we found only eight firms (out of a sample of 51) 
that changed board composition between 2002 and 2004, and three firms that had not complied 
with the requirement by the end of 2004. Other firms were already in compliance with the 
minimum requirement throughout the study period.  
It is uncertain how far an enhancement of board independence would help to reduce 
tunneling. This requires further research to examine the practice of board independence and 
those who are hired as independent directors to better assess the effectiveness of the board 
independence regime. We observed an improvement to some corporate governance records in 
Hong Kong between the two periods of the study, whereas Singapore maintained the same 
standard in both periods. However, this article declines to draw an inference that RPTs were 
reduced due to corporate governance reforms. This is subject to further empirical studies. 
B. Disclosure and Information for Gatekeepers 
 A deeper question is how to ensure that independent directors or other gatekeepers 
properly do their job by effectively reviewing the RPTs that amount to tunneling. The nature of 
tunneling means that those who want to tunnel often try to conceal their true intentions to prevent 
wrongdoing from being discovered. To help directors, shareholders or other gatekeepers make 
sound decisions, there must be sufficient information for them to form proper judgments. Thus, 
improving disclosure and information is an important aspect of OECD principles, especially 
information on the control structure and related party transactions.119 There are two levels of 
information flow: access to information by independent directors and auditors, and the disclosure 
of information to the public.  
First, it is unclear (or at least it might vary greatly between companies) whether 
independent directors have good access to information. There is a possibility for moral hazard if 
                                                 
118 Chen et al., supra note 115, at 1011-1013. 
119 OECD principles, supra note 2, at 5-6 and 41 et seq. 
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corporate insiders exploit the lack of information flow inside a firm to disguise tunneling 
activities as beneficial RPTs. This situation may also exist when independent directors or 
auditors either do not do their job properly or simply do not have sufficient information before 
them when making decisions. The underlying and omnipresent challenge of distinguishing good 
RPTs from bad ones is also a factor. Therefore, there may be a grey zone, and corporate insiders 
may take advantage of the gatekeepers’ lack of information or capacity to approve transactions, 
even if it is unfair to the firm.  
Enhancing or strengthening the independent directors’ access to information should be an 
important complementary tool to any board independence regime. In both Hong Kong and 
Singapore, corporate governance codes, based on OECD principle IV(A), specify that directors 
should make informed decisions. To do so, the codes prescribe that they be given the appropriate 
information in a timely manner120 and have access to board papers and related materials.121 It is 
the obligation of management to supply the board and committees with such adequate 
information.122 It is the responsibility of the chairman to ensure that directors receive complete 
and reliable information.123 The codes in both the Singapore and Hong Kong also stipulate that 
directors should have independent access to the company secretary to acquire information.124 
Therefore, in theory, as long as companies comply with the corporate governance codes, 
directors should be provided with sufficient information or have access to information if they 
make further enquiries. Having said that, how information flows inside a firm is not crystal clear 
to outsiders. Further, minority shareholders may have less access to internal information and thus 
be less likely to affect the management decisions. 125  Empirical studies are needed to fully 
understand the internal relationship between the board and other power structures within firms. 
This area may be one that policymakers should focus on in future reforms to improve corporate 
governance.  
                                                 
120 Hong Kong Exchange, Code of Corporate Governance Practices, Principle A.6 (HK Code); Singapore Code of 
Corporate Governance, Principle 6 (SG Code). 
121 HK Code A.6.3; SG Code Guidelines 6.2. 
122 HK Code A.6.2; SG Code Guidelines 6.1. 
123 HK Code A.2.3; SG Code Guidelines 3.2. 
124 SG Code Guidelines 6.3; HK Code A.1.4. We take note that the Singapore Code uses the phrase “separate and 
independent access,” whereas the Hong Kong Code only specifies that “[a]ll directors should have access to …”  
125 Pizzo, supra note 32, at 322. 
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Second, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the merits and problems of related 
party disclosure rules under accounting standards or listing rules, or to evaluate the quality of 
such disclosures. The coding exercise has shown that there is a wide range of procedures 
companies use to report RPTs in financial statements. For example, some companies duly report 
the names of related parties and relevant relationships; others simply label them as general 
categories (e.g., holding companies or associates), without providing further detail. Details may 
be sorely lacking with respect to transactions or even the identities of related parties.  
It is no better for disclosures of IPTs in Singapore or CTs in Hong Kong. In Singapore, 
the disclosure of IPTs is rather imprecise, often revealing only the aggregate amount (or the 
amount for different interested persons). In most cases there are no details on the nature of the 
transactions or the related parties.126 Conversely, in Hong Kong, there is often more information 
on CTs, including the time, place, nature, parties involved and amount of the transactions. 
Although it is good to have more information, it is provided in paragraphs that may not be easy 
for shareholders to go through if a company has pages of connected transactions.127 In addition, 
the CT reports are included in the Directors’ Report, which is in the middle of long annual 
reports. It is easy for shareholders to miss them unless they know where to look for the 
information. Therefore, there may be a need to standardize the ways and forms in which RPTs 
are disclosed in financial statements or annual reports. In addition, there may be a need to call for 
more complete disclosures of RPTs to reduce the chance of arbitrage between legal and 
accounting rules.128 Better standardization would help shareholders and market participants gain 
more insight into RPTs and form market power.  
With so many continuing IPTs or CTs in Singapore and Hong Kong, there has been a 
lack of detail over how they are transacted after a shareholders’ mandate is approved by a 
general meeting. In Singapore, shareholders, at best, acquire some knowledge on the aggregate 
amount in the annual report without many details. In Hong Kong, there is also no further 
breakdown except for a paragraph repeating some basic information from the circulars and 
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. Annual Report 2016-17, at p. 228. 
127 See, e.g., CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd. Annual Report 2016, at p. 125-27. 
128 Atanasov et al., supra note 24, at 40-41. 
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providing at least the annual transaction amount or stating that the aggregate transaction amount 
is below the ceiling authorized by the shareholders.   
Third, the presence of many foreign listings (with major operations and assets outside the 
market) may pose further challenges to the information problem. This issue is especially 
prominent in Hong Kong, where the stock market is dominated by firms registered outside of the 
special administrative region. In the 2002-04 sample, 78.34% of the Hong Kong observations 
were registered in foreign jurisdictions, as opposed to a mere 1.96% (i.e., just one firm) in the 
Singapore sample. The pattern continued in the 2009-15 dataset, in which 81.88% of the Hong 
Kong observations were foreign companies, compared to 14.56% in Singapore.  
Where did those foreign-incorporated firms come from? In the 2002-04 time frame, the 
Hong Kong sample showed that most of the foreign firms (about 72% of all sampled firms) were 
registered in either Bermuda or the Cayman Islands, with 10 firms incorporated in mainland 
China (6.37% of all observations in Hong Kong). In contrast, all but three firms in the Singapore 
sample were local. The pattern continued in the 2009-15 dataset. Most foreign companies listed 
in Hong Kong were registered in either mainland China (11.37%) or the Caribbean Islands 
(about 71%), whereas the Singapore market was still predominantly occupied by domestically 
registered firms (about 85%). Thus, there was a sharp contrast between the companies listed in 
the two markets in terms of their national origins. 
How do foreign companies trade RPTs? In Hong Kong, there was a contradictory pattern 
between the two periods. In 2002-04, the mean of the total number of RPTs was US$37.56 
million for local companies, compared with US$13.25 million for foreign listings. In contrast, 
for 2009-15, the mean of the total RPTs for foreign companies was US$455.43 million (median 
= US$2.16 million), as opposed to US$149.20 million (median = US$4.89 million) for local 
companies. However, when a two-sample t-test was used to analyze logged RPT data, we found 
that local companies traded more RPTs than foreign companies both in 2002-04 (p<0.001) and 
2009-15 (p=0.003). Thus, it may be wrong to target foreign companies. 
In Singapore, considering the few observations of foreign listings at the time, it was 
meaningless to examine the difference between 2002-04, and 2009-15. We found that local firms 
traded more RPTs than foreign listings in the Singapore market (p=0.01) during both periods. 
There have indeed been Chinese listings in Singapore, because the so-called S-chips have had 
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their fair share of governance problems in the Singapore market.129 However, if we measure the 
size of companies by market capitalization in SGX, such as the component stocks in the lead 
Straits Times Index,130 most are large local companies. The local firms are likely to be larger 
than the foreign companies we collected in our sample. Thus, the higher number of RPTs among 
local companies in 2009-15 can be explained. 
The data were inconclusive on whether foreign listings were more likely to tunnel than 
local ones (or vice versa). Nonetheless, this result does not change the presence of so many 
foreign listings in the Hong Kong market. Further, it remains unclear how independent directors, 
auditors and shareholders can acquire sufficient information to review and verify RPTs, 
especially when the transactions take place on foreign soil with foreign related parties. With the 
rise in the cross-border flow of companies conducting business and floating in foreign capital 
markets, having international standards or guidance on corporate governance is justified to some 
extent. However, as mentioned earlier, how to adapt the standards to meet the peculiar problems 
of foreign listings may continue to be a problem in the future once we look beyond the common 
standards. 
C. Effectiveness of Independent Review and Approval 
 This article casts some doubt on the effectiveness of independent review and/or approval. 
The previous two sections explored issues regarding corporate governance, independent directors 
and disclosure. This section focuses on the opinions of independent financial advisers (IFAs) and 
the recommendations of independent directors for CTs or IPTs in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
These opinions may help to improve the quality of the information received by boards of 
directors or shareholders to help them make decisions. 
 As mentioned in Part II above, both Hong Kong and Singapore require shareholder 
approval for certain CTs or IPTs (including mandates for continuing transactions). To help 
shareholders make fair assessments of proposed transactions, in the circular issued to 
                                                 
129 One report showed that 10% of the S-Chips were suspended from trading due to governance or accounting issues 
by 2011. J Kwok, “Are S-chips still a possible play?” The Straits Times, December 25, 2011, 
http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/digitised/issue/straitstimes20111225-1.  
130 As of December 2017, the Straits Times Index comprised 30 stocks, with 21 locally incorporated companies or 
trusts. See Singapore Exchange, http://www.sgx.com/wps/portal/sgxweb/home/marketinfo/indices/sti_constituents 
(last visited October 25, 2018).  
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shareholders before their general meetings, companies must produce valuation opinions provided 
by an IFA in addition to the opinions of independent board members (comprised only of 
independent directors). 
 In this research, a total of 813 circulars were collected for our sampled companies during 
the study periods, including 130 in Singapore (7 in 2002-04 and 123 in 2009-15) and 683 in 
Hong Kong (107 in 2002-04 and 576 in 2009-15). Several IFAs were mentioned in these 
circulars, although some (e.g., First Shanghai Capital Ltd. and Guangdong Securities were each 
hired more than 20 times) appeared more often than others. Without further information, it was 
difficult to judge the relationship between an IFA and a firm. 
 Regardless of the period, in Hong Kong all observations showed that the IFA treated the 
company’s valuation as fair and reasonable. In Singapore, for all observations in which we could 
identify information, the IFAs always considered IPTs based on normal commercial terms. In 
sum, we did not identify a single situation in which the IFA offered a negative opinion. 
 For independent board members’ recommendations to shareholders, in all Hong Kong 
observations the independent directors recommend that shareholders vote in favor of a CT or a 
mandate. In Singapore, in all but one case independent directors recommend that shareholders 
vote in favor of an IPT or a mandate. In the sole exception, the independent directors only 
cautioned that the “[shareholders] should read and consider carefully this Circular in its entirety 
before giving your approval pertaining to the Pre-Mandate IPTs and IPT Mandate.”131 It is not 
that the directors never dissented.132 However, it is quite unlikely that dissenting opinion would 
have been published. If so, it means that the independent directors have tended to agree with the 
management on the merits of IPTs or CTs.  
 In practice, IFAs almost always consider valuation to be fair or the transaction to be on 
normal commercial terms, and independent directors almost always recommend that 
shareholders vote in favor of a transaction or mandate. This raises the question of whether 
independent review and shareholder approval are effective.  
                                                 
131 See, e.g., Circulars to Shareholders by VGO Corporation Ltd. dated July 10, 2014, at p. 16; Siow Li Sen, Rift 
Between Stanley Tan and Directors Far from Over, Business Times Singapore (June 28, 2007); Michelle Quah, 
Automated Touchstone Independent Directors Ousted, Business Times Singapore (April 21, 2007).  
132 Chung Tai Printing Holdings Ltd Shareholders’ Circular dated June 16, 2009, at p. 8. 
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On the bright side, the lack of variety in the dissenting opinions of public shareholder 
documents or announcements could indicate that independent review and approval work. 
Companies are probably less likely to proceed with a vote at a general meeting if either the IFA 
or independent directors offer negative opinions. We only saw cases in which the IFAs and 
independent directors concurred with the interests of the companies. If this is the case, such a 
regime was functioning as expected. 
The counter-argument is that firms may choose friendly IFAs or board members to 
ensure that transactions go through. Although we do not have comprehensive data on this, stories 
have been occasionally reported in which independent directors have preferred to resign rather 
than dissent when they found something suspicious.133 There are incentives to entice IFAs to 
approve transactions for the sake of maintaining their business connections with the controlling 
shareholders or their affiliates.134 If this is the case, the lack of public disagreement in IFA 
opinions or dissenting opinions from independent directors does not suggest that all is well. 
This article has no means of determining which view is true. Nonetheless, in the future 
regulators may want to consider this when designing laws to reform RPTs. Policymakers should 
not blindly accept that IFAs or independent directors fulfil their expected functions, because in 
practice they almost always approve board actions and there is no clear evidence showing that 
they filter non-beneficial transactions effectively. 
D. More Ex Post Regulations? 
To enhance the effectiveness of ex ante and process-driven approaches to RPTs, one 
possible solution is to increase shareholders access to redress against the controlling shareholders 
they suspect to be the primary source of tunneling. Alternatively, the duties of corporate 
management could be enhanced to deter them from tunneling.  
Our data may lend partial support to this idea, because a significant number of RPTs 
between 2009 and 2015 were with holding companies or their associates or subsidiaries. There is 
                                                 
133 E.g., it was reported that Mr. Alfred Au Yan stepped down from the board after objecting to a connected 
transaction with the company’s controlling shareholder. See Chung Tai Printing (0055): INED Alfred Au Yan to step 
down at AGM (July 30, 2009), https://webb-site.com/dbpub/subject.asp?t=31 (last visited October 25, 2018). See 
also Circulars to Shareholders by Chung Tai Printing Holdings Ltd. dated June 16, 2009, at p. 7-8. 
134 See Wan, supra note 98. 
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an inherent danger of “expropriation of minority shareholders by the shareholders of high-up 
group firms through tunneling resources out of their firms.” 135  Given that many non-SOE 
conglomerates in Hong Kong and Singapore are owned by wealthy families, there is also a risk 
that family-run groups may decay over time due to the dilution of their ownership and control 
across descendants (especially after the founder has passed away).136 These factors could support 
the view that controlling shareholders should be held accountable for tunneling. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this article to examine whether Hong Kong or Singapore should impose 
fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders, and if so, how such duties could be imposed.137 
 Although a comprehensive discussion of independent directors’ effectiveness is beyond 
the scope of this article, it is worth pointing out that there have been few cases of independent 
directors being charged with negligence for failing to uncover wrongdoing.138 Arguably, the 
rules of liability are not sufficiently punitive to encourage independent directors to do their job. 
Imposing a duty or liability is clearly only one step toward effective deterrence.  
Our data suggest that RPTs with holding companies (and related persons) should be the 
focus in the future, because they constitute a large portion of RPTs. Under this view, imposing 
more rules of liability may be an option if policymakers want to create a greater deterrence effect. 
However, doing so would require an overall assessment of all available enforcement authorities 
to determine the effectiveness of liability rules in preventing tunneling. 139 This consideration 
would in turn affect whether the law should impose more duties on directors or controlling 
shareholders. This would require a more comprehensive study that is beyond the scope of this 
article.140 Thus, this article refrains from making a conclusive statement on the imposition of 
additional liability. 
                                                 
135 Marianne Bertrand et al., Mixing family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind 
Them, 88 J. OF FIN. ECON. 466, 479 (2008), citing Marianne Bertrand et al., Ferreting Out Tunneling: An 
Application to Indian Business Groups, 117 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 121 (2002) and Stijin 
Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, J. OF FIN. ECON. 81 (2000). 
136 See generally Bertrand et al., id. (2008). 
137 See generally Lim, supra note 79. 
138 Wan et al., supra note 80, at 19, 21 and 29. 
139 See generally Gordon Y. M. Chan, Understanding the Enforcement Strategy for Regulating the Listing Market of 
Hong Kong, 14 J. OF CORP. L. STUDIES 79 (2014). 
140 For some analyses of public and private enforcement actions in Hong Kong and Singapore, see Wan et al., supra 
note 80.  
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V. Conclusion 
 This article examined the effect of applying the transnational Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance standards in Hong Kong and Singapore from the national to the firm level. 
Following the U.K.’s Cadbury Report in 1992 and the OECD’s Principles of Corporate 
Governance, reinforced by some global rankings, this article suggests that the core ideas 
underpinning corporate governance standards, such as board independence and transparency, are 
akin to transnational law. However, although improving corporate governance is generally a 
sound idea, it is unclear whether corporate governance codes that give effect to transnational 
corporate governance are complied with in practice. Further, there is the question of whether 
adopting these regimes can effectively achieve policy goals. 
 When we examined the impact of the markets’ adoption of transnational corporate 
governance on the RPT data, we found certain concerns that regulators should reconsider. First, 
the incidence of RPTs (particularly with holding companies and associated companies), and the 
significant increase in RPTs in Hong Kong, highlights the importance of a sound corporate 
governance system. This is extremely relevant in the context of the highly concentrated 
ownership in Hong Kong and Singapore. There were incidents in which annual mandates 
allowed RPTs to take place without the close scrutiny that would ordinarily be required for 
individual RPTs. The data also revealed the inconclusiveness of the information disclosed. As 
such, it is important to revisit the elements of corporate governance as they relate to RPTs and to 
consider reform. Any such reform must consider the high concentration of shareholdings and the 
challenge of regulating foreign listings. Further empirical studies, which are likely to take the 
form of interviews, should investigate how directors and independent gatekeepers, (such as 
auditors and IFAs), scrutinize RPTs at board or audit committee meetings and the kinds of hard 
questions they ask.  
In sum, over-reliance on independent review and approval may be misplaced if dissenting 
or countering opinions are lacking or not published for shareholders. Whether independent 
directors or audit committees would have the information needed to monitor RPTs and 
continuing IPTs and CTs remains a concern. There is a likelihood that independent directors or 
financial advisers may be used to rubber stamp and validate otherwise dubious transactions. 
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Although this article does not fundamentally challenge the idea of transnational corporate 
governance or the OECD principles, we suggest that national regulators should not blindly copy 
and paste international standards (even though widely adopted globally) without considering the 
dual local challenges of high ownership concentration and foreign listings. 
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